SPS. DAN T. PAGUIRIGAN G.R. No. 169177
and MARY JANE PAGUIRIGAN,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),*
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,**
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PILHINO SALES CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This petition for review on certiorari
with motion for contempt,[1] assails the April 8, 2005 Decision[2] and
the August 3, 2005 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85876 which set aside the December 16,
2003 Order[4] of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 210 dismissing Civil Case
No. MC00-1260, for failure of respondent Pilhino Sales Corporation to prosecute.
Petitioners
are spouses Dan Paguirigan and Mary Jane Paguirigan, doing business under the
name and style of Danny Boy Liner and/or Dalmatian Lines. A controversy arose between petitioners and respondent
Pilhino Sales Corporation in connection with an alleged transaction involving three
buses.
It
appears from the records that there are two civil cases involving petitioners
and respondent corporation, namely: (1) Civil Case No. MC98-214 before the
Civil Case No. MC98-214 raffled to
Branch 214 is a complaint for sum of money filed by respondent corporation
against petitioners but was dismissed on
On
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration of the
However,
on
During
the scheduled pre-trial conference on
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN DISREGARDING SECTION 3, RULE 17 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE LEGAL
EFFECTS OF THE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL DATED 26 MARCH 1999 AND 02 JUNE 2000 OF
BRANCH 214, RTC MANDALUYONG OUSTING BRANCH 210, RTC-MANDALUYONG AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS TO TRY THE RE-FILED CASE.[14]
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IN LIEU OF LOST
APPEAL ON THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE RE-FILED CASE WHERE RESPONDENT AND
COUNSEL ARE ADMITTEDLY AGAIN ABSENT IN THE PRE-TRIAL.[15]
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ALLOWING THE RE-FILED CASE TO PROCEED AS IT UNDERMINES THE RULE
PROHIBITING FORUM SHOPPING AND ALLOWS
INTERFERENCE WITH A JUDGMENT OF
Petitioners contend that the orders
dated
In its comment, respondent admits that
the orders of dismissal of Branch 214 have become final but claims that the
dismissal was without prejudice and not an adjudication on the merits.
The issues for resolution in this
case are as follows: (1) whether Branch 210 and the Court of Appeals have
jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MC00-1260; and (2) whether respondent’s
absence during the pre-trial conference on
The petition lacks merit.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec.
3. Dismissal due to plaintiff. – If,
for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation
of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis
added)
As correctly observed by respondent,
the June 2, 2000 Order clearly stated that the dismissal was without prejudice
and that respondent is not precluded from re-filing the complaint should it
desire to pursue its claim against the petitioners. Further, petitioners actively participated in
the proceedings before Branch 210 and even sought positive relief during the
pre-trial on
Anent the second issue, it must be emphasized
that a pre-trial is mandatory and plaintiff’s absence therein can result to the
dismissal of the case. Section 5, Rule
18 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec.
5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when
so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal
of the action. The dismissal shall be
with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. x x x.
However, the rule is not absolute; it
admits of certain exceptions. We agree
with the observation of the Court of Appeals that –
In
this case, We find that the dismissal of the cased (sic) based on the failure
of petitioner’s counsel to appear during the
For
one, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that petitioner had
manifested lack of interest to prosecute.
It neither abandoned the suit nor needlessly delayed the proceedings. Rather, what is self-evident is that in all
the six (6) previously scheduled pre-trial conference, petitioner’s counsel was
in attendance and had demonstrated his vigorous resolve to prosecute the case
with reasonable promptitude. In fact,
the cancellation of all the previously scheduled pre-trial was the result of
either the court’s inability to conduct the pre-trial or respondent’s motion to
the same effect. It was only in the
seventh (7th) scheduled pre-trial conference when petitioner’s
counsel was absent, and for good reasons,
i.e. petitioner counsel’s medical condition (allergic dermatitis with
infection of left scrotum) that even necessitated his confinement on the day
immediately following the scheduled pre-trial conference.
If
such absence had upset the court a quo’s schedule or its intention to promptly
prosecute the case, a mere admonition for petitioner’s counsel, instead of outright dismissal, would
have been sufficient for the parties to be informed of the public respondent
judge’s intolerance of any display of tardiness and laxity in the observance of
his orders from the part of the contending parties.
The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the
case of Calalang vs. Court of Appeals, applies strongly in this case, viz:
“x
x x though it is within the discretion of the trial court to declare a party
non-suited for non appearance in the pre-trial conference, such discretion must
not be abused. The precipitate haste of
the lower court in declaring the respondent bank non-suited was uncalled for
and deserved a second look.
x
x x x x x x x x
Unless
a party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as
to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts
should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the
desired end. ‘Inconsiderate dismissals,
even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the
congestion of court dockets, while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to
records of the individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning
between the parties. In the absence of
clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief
continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the
court.’ (Ruiz vs. Estenzo, 186 SCRA 8 [1990] citing Macasa vs. Herrera, 101
Phil. 44 [1957]). And there is authority
that an order dismissing a plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure
of his counsel to appear at a pre-trial conference must be reversed as too
severe a sanction to visit on a litigant where the record is devoid of evidence
reflecting the litigant’s willful or flagrant disregard for the Court’s
authority.”
In this case, the dismissal was based
solely on respondent’s absence during the pre-trial conference on December 16,
2003. A single instance of
non-appearance at the pre-trial due to medical reasons does not amount to
willful disregard of the orders of the lower court and will not justify the
dismissal of the complaint. That
respondent vigorously prosecuted the case before Branch 210 was not contested
by petitioners. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals noted that respondent had not manifested a lack of interest to
prosecute. In fact, respondent’s
counsel was present at all the previously scheduled pre-trial conferences. Moreover, the cancellations, re-settings and delays
were not caused by respondent’s inordinate refusal or laxity in prosecuting the
case. In Marahay v. Melicor,[18]
we ruled that:
While
a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for
the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. In the absence of a pattern
or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the
case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their
authority to dismiss.
So
it is with the case at bar. Respondent
has not shown culpable negligence warranting the dismissal of its complaint. The ends of justice and fairness would best
be served if the issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown
trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85876 dated April
8, 2005 which set aside the December 16, 2003 Order of the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
(On Official Leave)
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
*
On official leave.
**
Acting Chairman.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-47.
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[18]
G.R. No. 44980, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 811, 817.